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The ‘Occupied Lens’ in Wartime
China: Portrait Photography in the
Service of Chinese ‘Collaboration’,
1939–1945
Jeremy E. Taylor
This article explores the importance of portrait photography to the wartime
collaborationist regime of Wang Jingwei, which governed parts of Japanese-
occupied China from 1940 to 1945. The article demonstrates how, for
a combination of practical, political, and cultural reasons, studio portraiture
was chosen as one of the primary forms of media for the propagation of
iconography by this administration. Studio portraiture was also, however,
a realm in which this Chinese regime sought to stamp its own mark on visual
culture, separate from the iconography of the occupying Japanese. The article
demonstrates this by tracing the origins and fate of a number of widely
circulated studio portraits of Wang taken in 1939, 1940, and 1941. This article
also speculates about the possibility of identifying and defining an ‘occupied
lens’ during the war, one which was clearly derivative of prewar forms yet
evolved in ways which set it apart both from Japanese propaganda and from
the visual culture of resistance.
Keywords: China, Japan, foreign occupation, war, studio photography, portraits,
leaders, Wang Jingwei (1883–1944), Bann’s Studio (Guangyi zhaoxiangguan), Liang
Boping (dates unknown)
In her book Visual Occupations, Gil Hochberg demonstrates how we might
understand the ‘making of the [Israel-Palestine] conflict […] by focusing on
the distribution of the visual’.1 Noting that invasion and occupation, by their
very nature, lead to acts of concealment, as well as to the proscription of
certain ‘ways of seeing’,2 Hochberg suggests that questions need to be asked
about the very milieu of occupation from the starting point of the visual.
Such questions include ‘what or who can be seen, what or who remains
visible, who can see and whose vision is compromised’ in the occupation
context.3 Such questions build on Nicholas Mirzoeff’s argument that ‘visuality
is a specific technique of colonial and imperial practice […] by which power
visualizes History to itself’.4 They also address a growing body of literature on
the place of photography in the visuality of foreign occupation, and specifi-
cally the ‘asymmetries and absences’ which typify photojournalism in recently
occupied societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan.5
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1 – Gil Z. Hochberg, Visual Occupations:
Violence and Visibility in a Conflict Zone,
Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2015, 5.
2 – A concept first developed in John Berger,
Ways of Seeing, London: Penguin 1973.
3 – Hochberg, Visual Occupations, 5.
4 – Nicholas Mirzoeff, ‘Introduction: For
Critical Visuality Studies’, in The Visual
Culture Reader, ed. Nicholas Mirzoeff,
London: Routledge 2013, xxix–xxxviii, xxx.
5 – See, for example, Susan L. Carruthers,
‘Why Can’t We See Insurgents? Enmity,
Invisibility, and Counterinsurgency in Iraq
and Afghanistan’, Photography and Culture,
8:2 (2015), 191–211.
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Hochberg’s focus on ‘what or who can be seen’ is entirely valid for the
ongoing conflict that is her topic. In applying such questions to historical
cases of foreign occupation, however, the notions of concealment and
absence take on a very different pertinence. In most of the histories written
of the Japanese occupation of China, for example, questions of ‘what or who
can be seen’ do not apply purely to the visual regimes put in place by the
Japanese, but also to strategies deployed by successive Chinese governments
who, since the end of World War II, have sought to obfuscate, dismiss, or,
more recently, render invisible the visual cultures that were sustained by the
Chinese who worked in the service of various ‘client regimes’.6 In the
narrative of patriotic resistance that has become so central to Chinese
nationalism since the 1990s,7 there is little space for seeing the visual
forms of expression created by Chinese under occupation, unless such
forms of expression can be interpreted as acts of overt resistance.8 This
tendency can be found in scholarship undertaken outside China as well,
especially when it comes to photography. With a few exemplary exceptions,
often undertaken by historians of Japan and written from the perspective of
the ‘colonial gaze’,9 photography in occupied China has been absent from all
of the standard histories of the topic in English,10 and from accounts of
photography during the war against Japan in Chinese.11 Indeed, photographs
produced under occupation have usually been deployed as mere discursive
tools to illustrate supposedly treasonous behaviour.12 Contrast such silence
to the extensive work on wartime Chinese photography produced in areas
beyond Japanese control in the name of resistance,13 and on Japanese
photography produced in other parts of occupied Asia, such as the ‘client
regime’ of Manchukuo (1932–45).14
Despite such historiographical lacunae, photography was crucially impor-
tant to one of the most studied ‘client regimes’ in Japanese-occupied China –
the Reorganised National Government (RNG) led by the veteran Chinese
statesman and former premier of the Republican Chinese government, Wang
Jingwei, from spring 1940 until the Japanese surrender in autumn 1945. This
was the last but most ambitious of such ‘client regimes’ established under the
Japanese. It nominally governed large swathes of east and south China from its
reestablished capital of Nanjing, subsuming a number of preexisting puppet
states when formally launched in 1940. Intriguingly, this regime never claimed
to represent an ideological break with the Chinese republic from which it had
split. Rather, it claimed to represent a return to normalcy and peace under
Japanese dominion, resurrecting many of the institutions, practices, and sym-
bols of the prewar Chinese state.15
Photography was an important medium in the political culture of this
regime. The RNG compiled photographic histories of itself.16 It employed
Chinese photographers within its official Central News Agency (CNA;
Zhongyang dianxunshe), an organisation which argued that photographs
were ‘more practical than the written word [and] more popular and easy
to understand, but can also leave readers with an extremely deep impression’
(jiao wenzi tongsu er yi jie, dan yu duzhe yi ji shengke zhi yinxiang ye).17
It sponsored photographic pictorials and exhibitions, giving non-state
photographers a space in which to publish and display their work.18
Photography was also an accepted form of elite leisure under this regime,
with a number of the RNG’s highest ranking officials being keen amateur
photographers.19
At the same time, photography was always a realm of contested cultural
expression in occupied China. Despite assumptions about this ‘collaborationist’
regime being hand-in-glove with the Japanese, photography as a practice helps to
6 – Wang Ke-wen, ‘Irreversible Verdict?
Historical Assessments ofWang Jingwei in the
People’s Republic and Taiwan’, Twentieth
Century China, 28:1 (2002), 57–81. In this
article, I borrow the term ‘client regime’ from
David P. Barrett, ‘Introduction’, in Chinese
Collaboration with Japan, 1932–1945: The
Limits of Accommodation, ed. David P. Barrett
and Larry N. Shyu, Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press 2001, 1–17.
7 – Parks M. Coble, ‘China’s “New
Remembering” of the Anti-Japanese War of
Resistance, 1937–1945’, China Quarterly, 19
(June 2017), 394–410.
8 – This is in contrast to many other cases of
occupation, in which visual forms of expres-
sion such as photography have been a central
concern for a number of scholars. For exam-
ple, on photography during the American
occupation of Japan (1945–52), see Julia
Adeney Thomas, ‘Power Made Visible:
Photography and Postwar Japan’s Elusive
Reality’, Journal of Asian Studies, 67:2 (2008),
365–94.
9 – See, for example, Andrea Germer,
‘Artists and Wartime Politics. Natori
Yōnosuke: A Japanese Riefenstahl?’,
Contemporary Japan, 24:1 (2002), 21–50.
10 – See, for example,Brush and Shutter: Early
Photography in China, ed. JeffreyW.Cody and
Frances Terpak, Hong Kong: Hong Kong
University Press and the Getty Research
Institute 2011; and Wu Hung, Zooming In:
Histories of Photography in China, London:
Reaktion Books 2016.
11 – Such as Song Zhenjun, ‘Zai kang-Ri
zhanzheng zhong kangzhan zhuti de sheying
chuangzuo’ (The production of war-themed
photography during the War of
Resistance), Shenyang gongye xueyuan xue-
bao, 12:1 (2016), 7–12.
12 – As they are in Wang Jingwei yu Wang
wei zhengfu (Wang Jingwei and the bogus
Wang government), ed. Huang Renyuan,
Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan 1994.
13 – Claire Roberts, Photography and
China, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press 2013, 91–99.
14 – Annika A. Culver, Glorify the Empire:
Japanese Avant-Garde Propaganda in
Manchukuo, Vancouver: UBC Press 2013,
100–33.
15 – David P. Barrett, ‘The Wang Jingwei
Regime, 1940–1945: Continuities and
Disjunctures with Nationalist China’, in
Chinese Collaboration with Japan, ed.
Barrett and Shyu, 102–15.
16 – Such as Zhongyang dianxunshe,
Zhongguo canzhan yi lai dashi xiezhen zhuanji
(An album of photographs of major events in
China since the declaration of war on the
allies), Nanjing: Zhongyang dianxunshe 1944.
17 – Ibid., 2.
18 – Details of a number of such exhibitions
are listed in Bianzhe (The editor), ‘Fuyin
qianxi’ (On the eve of publication),
Changjiang huakan 4:2 (February 1945), 30.
The Changjiang huakan (Yangtse pictorial)
itself regularly featured landscape and other
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expose just how non-collaborative the relationship between the RNG and Tokyo
could be. Chinese intellectuals openly expressed displeasure at the photographic
practices of Japanese tourists at sites of political importance in occupied China, for
example.20 Also, when CNA photojournalists travelled through occupied areas of
the country in 1940 to document life under Japanese rule, they had to be under the
strict control of Japanese military minders.21 As I shall demonstrate in the
following, this tension was present even in the iconography produced by the
RNG, for certain forms of photography came to be favoured precisely because
they allowed the Chinese a greater degree of autonomy from the Japanese,
challenging Japanese imperial propaganda which favoured promotion of the
image of the emperor.22 Indeed, in what I refer to as ‘the occupied lens’,23
a photographic perspective that was distinct from the colonial gaze and from the
photography espoused by agents of the Nationalist and Communist resistance
against the Japanese, we find a prism through which to address complex tensions
that arose in the realm of the visual during wartime.
This article represents the first time that such questions have been asked.
Utilising archival and photographic materials that have, for the most part, never
been analysed before,24 this study seeks to fill a major gap in the developing
literature on RNG China, much of which has hitherto overlooked the significance
of the visual in the making of this regime’s self-image.25 It does this by examining
portraiture, one specific form of photography which emerged as an important
strand in the political culture of the RNG, charting the ways in which studio
portraits in particular were used by this regime as a means of creating and
sustaining visual narratives around its leader. Such narratives were reactive to
attacks on Wang by artists working in the name of resistance, but also resisted
attempts by the Japanese to manage Wang’s image. The portraiture produced by
Chinese commercial photographic studios in the service of a collaborationist
regime was thus a realm of contestation in which Chinese ‘collaborators’ at the
same time countered rhetorical attacks from their Chinese enemies – which, quite
literally, presented Wang Jingwei as the ‘face’ of treason26 – and control of the
visual by a foreign occupier.
In considering the products of this occupied lens, I adopt an approach
which Irene Stengs defines as the ‘cultural biography of the portrait’, examin-
ing the creation and circulation of a handful of studio portraits of Wang
Jingwei which were produced at key points in the life of this regime, but then
used at different moments and for different purposes thereafter.27 In addition,
I make use of archival and published material from the time relating to
photographic practice and the circulation of portraiture in occupied China,
to situate the production and use of such portraits in the wider context of
the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). As shall become clear, there were
many continuities between prewar and occupation-era studio portraiture. This
reflected the training and background of individual photographers themselves,
as well as the ideology of Wang Jingwei’s administration, which claimed to be
reestablishing an orthodox Chinese polity in spite of the Japanese presence. At
the same time, however, restrictions on visual expression under occupation
determined what, to reference Hochberg again, could be seen and not seen in
occupied China.
More ambitiously, this article seeks to put Chinese photography under occu-
pation back into the wider story of photography in modern China more generally,
and therefore to allow it to be seen again. This is a crucial endeavour, because
a nascent body of scholarship on the role of photographic studios in China, and on
studio portraiture in particular, is starting to pose urgent questions regarding not
just the development of this modern form, but also the difficulty in distinguishing
the public and the private, and the commercial and official, when it comes to the
forms of photography in its many issues; for
another example, where a number of female
photographers operating under the RNGwere
featured, see Anon, ‘Renwu jieshao’
(Introduction to personalities), Zhonghua
huabao (China pictorial), 2:1 (February 1944),
12–13.
19 – Including the RNG foreign minister Chu
Minyi; photographic albums which once
belonged to Chu are now held in the Prints &
Photographs Reading Room (Lot 11700),
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
20 – Liu Longguang, ‘Heping yu zuguo’
(Peace and the motherland), Huawen
Daban meiri, 5:5 (March 1941), 19–23.
21 – Xue Huizi (photography by Xue
Diwei), E Gan shidi shichaji (A field survey
of Hubei and Jiangxi), Nanjing: Zhongyang
dianxunshe 1940.
22 – Morris Low, Japan on Display:
Photography and the Emperor, London:
Routledge 2006.
23 – I am indebted to Austin Parks of
Loyola University Maryland for the
expression ‘occupied lens’. Austin Parks,
‘The Occupied Lens: Japanese War
Photographers in North and South
Vietnam’, presented at the conference
Cultures of Occupation: Towards
a Transnational Dialogue, University of
Nottingham, January 2018.
24 – Including, although not limited to, the
Lin Baisheng Photographic collection held
at Stanford University’s East Asia Library.
This collection of over two hundred
photographs which once belonged to Lin
Baisheng (Wang Jingwei’s Minister of
Publicity) includes a number of important
studio portraits of Wang Jingwei. I thank
the East Asia Library, and particularly
Zhaohui Xue, for allowing me to work with
this important collection.
25 – For recent surveys of the literature on this
regime, see Yingying Gao, ‘A Survey of
Twenty-First-Century Studies of the Japanese-
Occupied Areas in China’, trans. Tian
Xiansheng, Journal ofModernChineseHistory,
9:1 (2015), 130–51; and David Serfass,
‘Occupation Japonaise et collaboration
Chinoise: Tendances historiographiques
récentes’ (The Japanese occupation and
Chinese collaboration: recent historiographi-
cal tendencies), Revue Historique, 680
(April 2016), 941–66.
26 – On definitions of treason in occupied
China, see Frederic Wakeman, Jr, ‘Hanjian
(Traitor)! Collaboration and Retribution in
Wartime Shanghai’, in Becoming Chinese:
Passages to Modernity, ed. Wen-hsin Yeh,
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press
2000, 313.
27 – Irene Stengs, ‘The Commodification of
King Chulalongkorn: His Portraits, Their
Cultural Biographies, and the Enduring Aura
of a Great King of Siam’, in Commodification:
Things, Agency, and Identities, ed. Wim M. J.
van Binsbergen and Peter L. Geschiere,
Münster: Lit Verlag 2005, 301–18.
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realm of photography in China. Such issues take on a quite different significance
when we start to consider them in the light of wartime politics.28
Studio Photography in Japanese-Occupied China
As a significant scholarship on Japanese propaganda explains, the Japanese inva-
sion in 1937 was accompanied by an explosion of photographic depictions of
China, produced for both a Japanese, home-front audience and for an occupied
Chinese readership.29 Japanese news agencies such as Asahi, Yomiuri, and Dōmei
dominated the production and circulation of photography in occupied areas
following the initial invasion.30 Occupation newspapers in this early period were
full of photographic images of China. In almost all cases, however, these images
traced their provenance to Japanese news photographers. In fact, even after the
founding of the RNG in March 1940, the main role of agencies such as the CNA,
when it came to photography, was to distribute images produced by Japanese
photojournalists.31
Nonetheless, there is one form of photography which survived the initial
onslaught, and in which Chinese photographers were able to continue to ply
their trade, albeit under difficult and often coercive conditions. This was studio
photography. The 1920s and 1930s had represented the heyday of studio photo-
graphy in China, when thousands of studios were opened in major cities. As Claire
Roberts notes, ‘portrait photographs, recording important personages, commem-
orations, and rites of passage, were shared with family, friends, and associates, and
published in the growing number of illustrated magazines and newspapers report-
ing on social and political change’ in this period.32 By the 1930s, this industry
served a growing demand from illustrated magazines, such as the much-studied
Liangyou (Young Companion), for glamour portraits of Chinese film celebrities,33
as the Hollywood ‘semiotics of glamour’ of which Liz Willis-Tropea has written
reached urban China.34 As Wen-hsin Yeh argues of cities such as Shanghai in the
prewar decade, ‘the camera stood at the center of an integrated cultural industry
that mobilized the capacities of multiple machines in the service of urban
consumerism’.35 In fact, so indigenised had studio photography become by the
1930s that China began to export studio photographers themselves to other parts
of Asia.36 Studio photography was, in other words, a form of expression that was
fully integrated into Chinese urban, commercial, middle-class culture by the out-
break of war in 1937.
Studio photography did not end with the Japanese invasion. Counter-
intuitively, the occupation necessitated the longevity of this industry. In
Shanghai’s International Settlement and French Concession, both initially spared
Japanese occupation by virtue of their special status under the so-called ‘Unequal
Treaties’ with foreign powers, a plethora of commercial studios continued to
operate, serving a middle-class clientele who continued to desire wedding, gradua-
tion, and family photographs (figure 1). In areas under direct Japanese control,
attempts to register local residents, so as to manage potentially recalcitrant popu-
lations, meant a boon in work for local photographers. Studio portraits were an
integral part of the production of liangmin zheng (good character cards), and
many residents who had never had portraits taken before were forced to have their
likeness produced for such purposes. In other cases, photographic studios were
called upon by Japanese military personnel to produce or reproduce photographs
to be sent home; and Chinese leaders at all levels of the ‘client regimes’ continued
the practice of producing photographic portraits of themselves to be used as gifts,
just as their prewar predecessors had done.37
In light of this context, it is not surprising that it was the world of studio
photography which Wang Jingwei’s so-called Peace Movement – the group of
Republican Chinese politicians, journalists, and intellectuals around Wang who
28 – Luke Gartlan and Roberta Wue,
‘Introduction’, in Portraiture and Early Studio
Photography in China and Japan, ed. Luke
Gartlan and RobertaWue, London: Routledge
2017, 1–14.
29 – David C. Earhart, Certain Victory:
Images of World War II in the Japanese
Media, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe 2008.
30 – Anne Tucker, et al., The History of
Japanese Photography, Houston: Museum
of Fine Arts 2003, 192.
31 – Zhongyang dianxunshe, Zhongyang
dianxunshe disannian (The third year of
the Central News Agency), Nanjing:
Zhongyang dianxunshe 1943, 21.
32 – Roberts, Photography and China, 65.
33 – Zhao Hao, ‘Liangyou huabao yu
Zhongguo xiandai sheying fazhan’ (The
Young Companion and the development of
modern Chinese photography), Zhejiang
yishu zhiye xueyuan xuebao, 8:4 (2010),
76–80.
34 – Liz Willis-Tropea, ‘Glamour
Photography and the Institutionalization of
Celebrity’, Photography and Culture, 4:3
(2011), 261–76.
35 – Wen-hsin Yeh, ‘Beyond the Frame:
The Camera in Republican China and
Wartime Chongqing’, in Brush and Shutter,
ed. Cody and Terpak, 115.
36 – Karen Strassler, ‘Cosmopolitan
Visions: Ethnic Chinese and the
Photographic Imagining of Indonesia in the
Late Colonial and Early Postcolonial
Periods’, Journal of Asian Studies, 67:2
(2008), 395–432.
37 – Tong Bingxue, Zhongguo zhaoxiang-
guan shi, 1859–1956 (A history of Chinese
photographic studios, 1859–1956),
Hong Kong: Shangwu yinshuguan 2017.
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advocated a negotiated peace with Japan rather than a continuation of armed
resistance – first turned to, in the absence of a formal state infrastructure for
propaganda, when it was seeking to repackage its leader for an urban Chinese
audience in summer 1939.38 This was the period following Wang Jingwei’s defec-
tion from the Chinese resistance in December 1938, after which he had moved
first to colonial Hanoi, where an unsuccessful attempt was made on Wang’s life by
Chinese resistance agents, and then to Shanghai. It was in Shanghai that Wang and
those around him engaged in direct negotiations with the Japanese on the estab-
lishment of a new Chinese administration under occupation.39
There already exists a significant literature on the role of political portrait
photography in the making of modern leaders in the pre-World War II decades in
Europe, when ‘the photograph displaced the painted portrait as the primary
medium of portraiture’.40 Such literature has shown how photographic technolo-
gies that had been developed in the commercial sphere could be redeployed in
official or partisan personality cults, and in the service of dictators, revolutionaries,
or monarchs. Advances in studio photography coincided with the rise of the
media-savvy politician, so that, as Maurizio Peleggi explains, ‘photography […]
was critical to the construction, rather than the mere projection’ of the image of
the modern leader.41
The RNG was no exception, and neither was the Chinese regime from which
it had split in 1939. As Joan Judge has argued, ‘Photographs are central to under-
standing the early Chinese Republic [as they] gave rise to new social practices and
new modes of sociability’.42 This included the rise of studio portraiture in
Republican Chinese political culture. The use of studio-produced photographic
portraits as political icons emerged as a practice in China as early as the 1910s,
with the reproduction of photographs of statesmen appearing regularly in the new
medium of the pictorial.43 There were also specific events, however, which
enhanced such developments. For example, the 1925 death in Beijing of the
Republic’s first head of state, Sun Yat-sen, led to the widespread use of photo-
graphic portraits as devotional objects in China.44 Such practices only intensified
with the elaborate reburial of Sun at a mausoleum in Nanjing in 1929 – an event at
which Wang Jingwei had not been present – as well as during the subsequent
Figure 1. Advertisement for Yin Hua
Photography Studio (Yin Hua sheyingshi),
one of many commercial photographic
studios active in Japanese-occupied
Shanghai, from Mingxing huabao, 2
(January 1943). From the Paul Kendel
Fonoroff Collection. Courtesy of the
C. V. Starr East Asian Library, University of
California, Berkeley.
38 – On the formation of the Peace
Movement, seeWang Ke-wen, ‘Wang Jingwei
and the Policy Origins of the “Peace
Movement”, 1932–1937’, in Chinese
Collaboration with Japan, ed. Barrett and
Shyu, 21–37.
39 – The most thorough study of this per-
iod remains Gerald E. Bunker, The Peace
Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China
War, 1937–1941, Harvard, MA: Harvard
University Press 1972.
40 – See, for example, Alessandra Antola,
‘Ghitta Carell and Italian Studio
Photography in the 1930s’, Modern Italy,
16:3 (2011), 251.
41 – Maurizio Peleggi, ‘The Aesthetics and
Politics of Royal Portraiture in Thailand’,
Ars Orientalis, 43 (2013), 84.
42 – Joan Judge, ‘Portraits of Republican
Ladies: Materiality and Representation in
Early Twentieth Century Chinese
Photographs’, in Visualising China,
1845–1965, ed. Christian Henriot and Wen-
hsin Yeh, Boston: Brill 2013, 131.
43 – Joan Judge, Republican Lens: Gender,
Visuality, and Experience in the Early Chinese
Periodical Press, Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press 2015, 33–38.
44 – Henrietta Harrison, The Making of the
Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and
Symbols in China, 1911–1929, Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2000, 133–48.
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‘Nanjing Decade’ (1927–37), when Chiang Kai-shek’s regime used photographic
portraits to promote personality cults associated with both the posthumous Sun
and with Chiang himself.45 The mass reproduction of photographic portraits of
political leaders and the display of these in public places – a practice still common
in Chinese political culture today – date from such Republican precedents. Most
importantly, however, such practices developed out of an unwritten alliance
between the commercial photographic and publishing industries in China’s main
urban centres and the Republican political elite, many of whom were only too
willing to adopt the techniques, technologies, and aesthetics developed in the
private sector for political ends. As a result, by the 1930s there operated in
Shanghai and other cities studios which specialised in producing portraits of
political and military leaders while also serving the needs of middle-class urbanites
and commercial publishers.46 This alliance resulted in some of the most iconic of
images in the Republican era, such as the widely circulated wedding photography
of Chiang Kai-shek and May-ling Soong produced by Chung Hwa Studio in
Shanghai in 1927.47
The political utility of commercially produced photographic portraits only
increased following the outbreak of war in 1937, as studio portraits of Chiang Kai-
shek, China’s main leader in the fight against Japan, were commissioned from
commercial studios (figure 2), and photographic imagery of Chiang in all manner
of militarised and martial pose became ubiquitous throughout ‘Free China’.48
While private studios played a key role in producing such imagery, however,
Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists also instituted new laws in this period regulating
the reproduction and display of such portraits.49 Ironically, a good deal of the
resultant portraiture, designed to rouse public support for the war against Japan,
emulated elements of imperial Japanese photography, including some of the most
commonly reproduced portraits of the Meiji emperor from the late nineteenth
century.50
Any new Chinese administration to emerge under occupation and claiming to
represent a return to Republican Chinese orthodoxy needed to adopt such stan-
dard forms of Chinese political iconography if it hoped to appear legitimate. This
is precisely what Wang Jingwei’s RNG did. By producing and circulating photo-
graphic portraits of Wang which could be given to followers as political gifts, hung
on office and classroom walls (figure 3) and reproduced in pro-Wang publications,
the Peace Movement took on the standard ritual trappings of prewar Chinese
statecraft.
There was something about studio portraiture, however, which was also
uniquely suited to the circumstances of occupation. In a recent study, Luke
Gartlan and Roberta Wue note how studio portraiture, quite unlike other forms
of photography, is ‘inherently collaborative’ in nature. Studio portraits are as much
a production of the sitter or client as they are of the photographer, with both
parties being involved in a negotiation which results in the creation of a new
likeness.51 This argument takes on added significance under foreign occupation,
for it suggests that the studio can itself be turned into a partially autonomous
space in which the occupied Chinese can strive to visually define themselves on
their own terms and in ways which are not always possible in other forms of visual
expression. If the Japanese authorities controlled so much else in the realm of
visual propaganda, from photojournalism to oil painting, it was logical for the
RNG to turn to a form of image-making which was recognisably Chinese, yet
which also offered an opportunity for greater RNG agency and independence.52
Photographic portraits were also an obvious choice for a regime which put so
much emphasis on the supposed charisma and political credibility of its nominal
leader, Wang having been one of the most important figures in Chinese politics
prior to the war. Indeed, the RNG was initially concerned with marketing Wang
Jingwei as a wise and patriotic martyr who was ready to put his life at risk for
45 – Jeremy E. Taylor, ‘Enemy of the People:
Visual Depictions of Chiang Kai-shek’, 2012,
Enemy of the People Digital Archive, available
at https://www.dhi.ac.uk/chiangkaishek/back
ground/(accessed 15 August 2019).
46 – Roberts, Photography and China,
72–77.
47 – Ibid., 73.
48 – Jeremy E. Taylor, ‘Republican
Personality Cults in Wartime China:
Contradistinction and Collaboration’,
Comparative Studies in Society & History,
57:3 (2015), 665–93.
49 – Ibid., 673.
50 – Mikiko Hirayama, ‘The Emperor’s
New Clothes: Japanese Visuality and
Imperial Portrait Photography’, History of
Photography, 33:2 (2009), 165–84.
51 – Gartlan and Wue, ‘Introduction’.
52 – On the RNG’s continual struggle for
autonomy from the occupying Japanese,
see Margherita Zanasi, Saving the Nation:
Economic Modernity in Republican China,
Chicago: Chicago University Press 2006,
209–21.
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peace – as evidenced in his survival of the assassination attempt in 1939 in
Hanoi – rather than rousing support for the occupation per se.53 All of this had
visual consequences, for it led to the RNG – and the Peace Movement from which
it had evolved – cultivating a metonymic relationship between Wang’s person and
face, and the polity over which he ruled. Given the centrality of emperor worship
to imperial Japanese propaganda and to the propaganda of rival puppet states such
as Manchukuo, this photographic promotion of Wang might even be interpreted
as a challenge to Japanese visual hegemony.54
Figure 2. Kwong Hua Studio, Chiang Kai-
shek, circa 1937. Used here on cover of
Fang Shaoyun, Zuigao lingxiu kangzhan
yanlunji (A collection of the Supreme
Leader’s speeches on the War of
Resistance), Guangzhou: Guangzhou tebie
shi dang bu 1938.
53 – On the importance of martyrdom to
the promotion of Wang, see Jeremy
E. Taylor, ‘From Traitor to Martyr:
Drawing Lessons from the Death and
Burial of Wang Jingwei, 1944’, Journal of
Chinese History 3:1 (January 2019), 137–58.
54 – Low, Japan on Display. On Puyi’s
emulation of Japanese royalty in the mid-
1930s, see Yamamuro Shin’ichi, Manchuria
under Japanese Dominion, trans. Joshua
A. Fogel, Philadelphia: University of
Philadelphia Press 2006, 162.
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Interestingly, photography even featured prominently in the Wang-centric textual
literature that the Peace Movement and the RNG propagated. Wang Jingwei’s own
attempt, during his time as a radical student leader, to assassinate the Manchu Prince
Regent Zai Feng in 1910 (subsequently considered proof of his legitimacy as a patriot and
revolutionary) had apparently been organised under the cover of a bogus photography
studio in Beijing. And it had been during a photo shoot in Beijing in 1935 that would-be
assassins (supposedly aligned to Chiang Kai-shek) had attempted to endWang’s life.55 As
both of these events were emphasised in RNG propaganda as proof of Wang’s self-
lessness, photography became a major feature of Wang Jingwei hagiography. During the
occupation, Wang’s earlier survival of such events would be worked into a grand
narrative about his supposed willingness to become a martyr in the service of peace.56
Contested Portraiture in the 1939–40 Period
In the period between Wang Jingwei’s initial defection from Chiang Kai-shek’s
government in December 1938 and the announcement in summer 1939 of his
Figure 3. Photograph of an unidentified
diplomat hanging a portrait of Wang
Jingwei on a wall in the Chinese (RNG)
embassy in Tokyo, June 1941. Courtesy of
The Mainichi Newspaper/AFLO.
55 – Howard L. Boorman, ‘Wang Ching-wei:
China’s Romantic Radical’, Political Science
Quarterly, 79:4 (1964), 504–25.
56 – On the importance of martyrdom in
narratives constructed around Wang Jingwei,
see Zhiyi Yang, ‘The Road to Lyric
Martyrdom: Reading the Poetry of Wang
Zhaoming (1883–1944)’, Chinese Literature,
37 (2015), 135–64.
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intention to negotiate a settlement with the Japanese, a number of prewar photo-
graphic portraits of Wang were circulated, by his supporters and by the Japanese,
in occupied China’s media. One such portrait (figure 4), produced in 1935 by the
privately-run Kwong Hwa Studio (Guanghua zhaoxiangguan) in Nanjing, the
studio of choice for Nationalist politicians in China’s capital prior to the war,57
was recycled with particular frequency in early 1939. This image presented Wang
with what was, at the time, referred to as a ‘chourong manmian’ (distressed
countenance)58 – his eyebrows raised in an expression of concern – and had
been used as the frontispiece in prewar collections of Wang’s writings.59 A second
image, possibly produced earlier in the decade but regularly reproduced in Peace
Figure 4. Kwong Hua Studio, Wang Ching-
wei, 1935. Frontispiece in Seyuan Shu, ed.,
Poems of Wang Ching-wei, London: George
Allen & Unwin 1938. © British Library
Board (X15/4597).
57 – Roberts, Photography and China, 75.
58 – He Peng, ‘Yi wei sheyingshi yanli de
Wang Jingwei’ (Wang Jingwei in the eyes of
a photographer), Shijixing (May 1995),
34–36.
59 – Poems of Wang Ching-wei, trans.




Movement propaganda, presented Wang as a friendly statesman, his gaze directed
at the viewer, suggesting (to reference Sontag) ‘solemnity, frankness, the disclosure
of the subject’s essence’,60 and the hint of a smile on his lips. In both cases, Wang
was presented in a distinctly urbane and civilian mode, dressed in a Western suit
and tie, thereby choosing a well-honed association with ‘worldliness, progress,
action, and financial success’.61 This marked Wang apart from his political mentor
Sun Yat-sen, and from many of his peers, all of whom were usually photographed
in a Sun Yat-sen tunic (Zhongshanzhuang), military uniform, or scholar’s robe
(changpao).
Both of these portraits, although primarily the former, were circulated in the
first half of 1939 in Japanese-language newspapers, and publications affiliated to
the Peace Movement in Hong Kong and Shanghai.62 The image of Wang with a
‘distressed countenance’, produced during a time when he had served as the
Republic of China’s premier, was redeployed to signify the notion of Wang’s
selflessness in seeking peace with a foreign invader; the second image, in contrast,
could be called upon when a more approachable image of Wang was required.
Significantly, no new studio portraits of Wang were produced in the first half of
1939, meaning that references to Wang in the press were illustrated with prewar
images such as these, which emphasised the continuity of his leadership. Some of
the most widely circulated collections of Wang’s speeches and essays distributed
by his Peace Movement supporters in this period featured no images of Wang at
all.63
In summer 1939, however, a new studio portrait of Wang was unveiled (figure 5).
This portrait would become one of the most frequently used and definitive images of
Wang for the remainder of the war. Although the provenance and precise date of the
production of this portrait is difficult to determine through extant sources,64 it was
almost certainly taken after Wang’s stay in Shanghai in late May 1939, whenWang was
engaged in formal negotiations with the Japanese.65 While I am yet to determine the
identity of the individual who took this photograph, Japanese-language newspapers
which helped to circulate this untitled portrait, such as the Shanghai-based Tairiku
Shimpo,66 credited it to the Zhonghua ribao (Central China Daily News), a Shanghai
broadsheet edited by Lin Baisheng (who would later serve as the RNG Minister of
Publicity), which recommenced publication in the guise of a PeaceMovement vehicle in
July 1939.67 This newspaper only published the image for the first time on
31 August 1939, after a number of other publications had used it.68 It may have been
the work of one of the Zhonghua ribao’s house photographers, Kang Zhengping,
a Shanghai-based photographer famed for his studio portraits of Republican statesmen
prior to the Japanese invasion.69 As with all of the early portraits of Wang produced in
the 1939–40 period (including others that I explore in the following), however, it was
never formally attributed to a single photographer. In captions appearing next to the
image in the occupation press, the portrait was usually defined in the sparsest of terms as
‘Wang Jingwei xiansheng jin ying’ (a recent image of Mr Wang Jingwei).70
In this 1939 image, Wang is dressed as he had been in most portraits produced in
the 1930s, in a dark three-piece suit, a spear point-collared white shirt, and a tie – the
attire of a wealthy Chinese businessman rather than a pro-Japanese activist. Split
lighting renders the left side of Wang’s face dark, and draws attention to his brillian-
tined hair, one of the signs of male glamour in the photographic portraiture in
illustrated magazines earlier in the century. The soft focus of the image and the
pose assumed by Wang give the photograph an almost pictorialist quality. He gazes
off-camera into the right middle-distance with an expression that suggests idealism,
purpose, and determination, but with the same raised eyebrows that had typified the
1935 Kwong Hwa studio portrait, thus suggesting continuities with prewar photo-
graphy. Yet this was not the same Wang Jingwei that the urban Chinese public were
accustomed to seeing in the prewar years, for this portrait presented a more defiant
image, especially in terms of the pose. It offered visual proof that Wang had survived
60 – Susan Sontag, On Photography,
New York: Rosetta Books 1975, 30.
61 – On the political significance of such
clothing, see Antonia Finnane, Changing
Clothes in China: Fashion, History, Nation,
New York: Columbia University Press
2008, 180.
62 – Lawrence M. W. Chiu, ‘The South
China Daily News and Wang Jingwei’s
Peace Movement, 1939–1941’, Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society of Hong Kong, 50
(2010), 343–70.
63 – One example being Nanhua ribao,
Wang Jingwei xiansheng zhongyao jianyi
(Important suggestions from Mr Wang
Jingwei), Hong Kong: Nanhua ribaoshe
1939.
64 – The only specific date I have seen
attached to this image is one in the Hawai’i
Times Photo Archive, where a scan of the
portrait lists the image (object number:
ddr-njpa-1-1063) as having arrived at the
offices of the Hawai’i Times (a Japanese-
language newspaper based in Honolulu) on
12 July 1939. Available at http://ddr.den
sho.org/ddr-njpa-1-1063-master
-4853ea7569/(accessed 15 August 2019).
65 – Don Bate, Wang Ching Wei: Puppet or
Patriot, Chicago: Ralph Fletcher Seymour
1941, 146–49.
66 – The image was published for the first
time in the Tairiku Shimpo on the front
page of the 11 July 1939 edition, where it
was credited to the Zhonghua ribao.
67 – Sei Jeong Chin, ‘The Historical
Origins of the Nationalization of the
Newspaper Industry in Modern China:
A Case Study of the Shanghai Newspaper
Industry, 1937–1953’, China Review, 13:2
(2013), esp. 7.
68 – This newspaper first used the image to
adorn an article entitled ‘Zhongguo
Guomindang zai Hu juxing diliuci quanguo
daibiao dahui’ (The sixth national congress
of the Kuomintang is convened in
Shanghai), Zhonghua ribao
(31 August 1939), 1.
69 – Jia Yihe, Minguo Shanghai sheying:
Haipai sheying wenhua qianshiji zhi yanjiu
(Photography in Republican Shanghai:
a study of Shanghai-style photographic
culture in the 20th century), Shanghai: Shiji
chuban 2016, 235–36.
70 – See, for example, Xuanchuanbu, Wang
Zhuxi heping jianguo yanlunji (Collection
of Chairman Wang’s speeches on peace and
nation building), Nanjing: Xuanchuanbu
1941, np.
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the assassination attempt by resistance agents in Hanoi just a fewmonths earlier, and,
by showing most of Wang’s body in its three-quarter framing, it seemed to emphasise
that Wang was in good health, despite the attempt on his life. Descriptions of the
image, such as an extended essay which accompanied it in a September 1939 issue of
the Chinese-language (but Japanese-financed and edited) pictorial Huawen Daban
meiri, entitled ‘tingshen fenqi heping jiuguo’ (lifting himself upright to save the nation
through peace), stressed Wang’s corporeality, but also his supposed vitality.71 As
Wang was rising from the dead, so too was an occupied China rising from the
ashes of war.
The non-descript background of this image is matched by the lack of props or
symbolic accoutrements in Wang’s outfit. This austere and almost timeless quality
may explain the portrait’s longevity. It was the preferred choice in Chinese-
language media when such outlets were reintroducing their readers to Wang in
Figure 5. Unknown photographer, portrait
of Wang Jingwei, circa July 1939. Courtesy
of The Mainichi Newspaper/AFLO.
71 – Taishi Gong, ‘Tingshen fenqi heping
jiuguo’ (Lifting himself upright to save the
nation through peace), Huawen Daban
meiri, 3:5 (September 1939), 4.
J. E. Taylor
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the second half of 1939, and a number of newspapers used it on their front pages
to mark Wang’s assumption of government on 30 March 1940.72 It was also
subsequently recycled for quite different purposes. The Japanese pharmaceutical
firm Rohto produced a lithographic version of the portrait in a newspaper adver-
tisement for its eye drops in spring 1940 – published even in the Zhonghua ribao,
where its strapline ‘Weiren yu ming shi yanyao’ (The world famous eye drops of
great men) at once calls Wang great, yet reduces his vision to a product of
Japanese industry.73 On the recognition of the RNG by the Axis powers in 1941,
the same portrait was placed by Mainichi editors alongside photographs of Adolf
Hitler and Benito Mussolini (figure 6). For the RNG itself, this portrait continued
to be used as the frontispiece for Ministry of Publicity (MoP) publications well
into 1941,74 as well as the basis for murals and banners of Wang. Occupation
newspapers were still using it some four years after its production as a generic
image that could illustrate Wang-themed news, especially during periods later in
the war when Wang’s health was deteriorating.75
This was not the only studio portrait to be produced in this early period.
A number of new portraits, also unattributed and undated, present a quite differ-
ent image of Wang, and were used for different purposes. In January 1940, for
example, a new headshot of Wang, this time gazing directly at the viewer – as he
had done in the 1935 portrait – began to be circulated (figure 7). This image shows
a more fully lit Wang in slightly clearer focus, so that the texture of his tie and
collar can be discerned. The defiant and slightly romantic air of 1939 has been
replaced by an expression of amiable solemnity, although the prominence given to
his brilliantined hair marks at least one commonality between the two images.
This portrait was distributed precisely as Wang’s imminent return to Nanjing
was being openly discussed in the Chinese press. Its circulation was almost
certainly timed to coincide with the conclusion of the Qingdao conference in
Figure 6. Portrait of Wang Jingwei along-
side photographs of Adolf Hitler and
Benito Mussolini. From Anon, ‘De Yi deng
ba guo chengren guomin zhengfu’ (Eight
countries, including Germany and Italy,
recognise the national government),
Huawen Daban meiri, 7:2 (July 1941).
Courtesy of the East Asia Library, Stanford
University.
72 – For example, ‘Qingzhu guomin zhengfu
huandu tekan’ (Supplement celebrating the
return of the national government),
Zhonghua ribao (30 March 1940), 1.
73 – ‘Weiren yu ming shi yanyao’ (The
world famous eye drops of great men),
Zhonghua ribao (30 March 1940), 11.
74 – Such as Xuanchuanbu, Wang Zhuxi
heping jianguo yanlunji.
75 – See, for example, ‘Wang Zhuxi fang Ri
zuo fan jing’ (Chairman Wang returned to
Nanjing yesterday after a visit to Japan),
Zhong bao (24 September 1943), 1.
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January 1940, when the structure of Wang’s nascent administration was decided.
While never being attributed to a specific photographer, this portrait appears to
have been created by the institutional predecessor to the MoP, the China News
Service (Zhonghua tongxunshe), a Shanghai-based office which was directly linked
to the Zhonghua ribao. It was used in official publications by related organisations
later in the war,76 and adorned publications celebrating Wang’s official return to
Nanjing in March 1940. The aforementioned Huawen Daban meiri used
a colourised version of this portrait on the cover of the issue it published to
celebrate the inauguration of Wang’s regime, as did the MoP, which used it as the
cover image of one its very first publications, a bilingual (Chinese and English)
programme produced to mark the festivities of March 1940 (figure 8).77 The image
also inspired banners produced to celebrate Wang’s arrival in Nanjing at the same
time (figure 9). It may well have been a version of this same ‘brightly painted
picture of our leader Chairman Wang standing some ten metres tall before us,
showing his amiable smile’ (Wang zhuxi xiezhen, youcai jiqi xianming, you san si
zhang gao, women de lingxiu, hexie de xiaorong, yanran zai muqian) that so
Figure 7. Unknown photographer, portrait
of Wang Jingwei, 31 January 1940. Denshō
Digital Repository (ddr-njpa-1-1084),
Hawai’i Times Photo Archives. Courtesy of
the Hawai’i Times Photo Archives
Foundation.
76 – Such as Zhongguo tongxinshe, Shin
Chūkoku no keizai dōkō (Economic trends
in new China), Tokyo: Zhongguo tong-
xinshe Dongjing shiju 1943.
77 – Ministry of Publicity, Special
Commemoration Issue: Return of the
National Government of the Republic of




Figure 8. Cover image of Ministry of
Publicity, Special Commemoration Issue:
Return of the National Government of the
Republic of China to its Capital, Nanjing:
Ministry of Publicity, 1940. Courtesy of
Shanghai Library.
Figure 9. Unknown photographer,
Nanking Chinese celebrating [sic],
March 1940. Corbis Images.
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impressed CNA photographers in the city of Wuhan during their visit there in
summer 1940.78
The 1939 and January 1940 portraits were not the only means of depicting
Wang Jingwei during this crucial, transitional period. In Japanese promotion of
Wang, other forms of photography and other forms of portraiture took pre-
cedence. One of the most widely circulated images of Wang in the occupation
press in spring 1940, for example, was not a studio portrait at all. It was,
rather, a news photograph of Wang in his trench coat and fedora, flanked by
his Peace Movement followers, visiting a rain-soaked Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum
in mid-March 1940, produced by an Asahi photojournalist (figure 10).79 Wang
may well be the central figure in this image, but he is framed and over-
shadowed by the imposing architectural symbol of the mausoleum, suggesting
a symbolic but very much hierarchical link between Wang and the late Sun
Yat-sen. The drab scene within which Wang is pictured here also includes
a disorderly band of ‘collaborators’ straggling beside and behind him, doing
little to present him as a charismatic leader. At the same time, the Japanese
government arranged for Japanese artists, including Kan’emon Asai, to paint
portraits in oils of Wang over the course of 1940 (figure 11).80 Few of these
portraits appear to have survived, but accounts by high-ranking RNG officials –
such as that written by Zhou Fohai, the RNG finance minister and lead
negotiator, who recorded in his diary the fact that Wang and other RNG
officials were presented with completed oil paintings of themselves in
March 1940, made by unnamed Japanese artists – suggest that Chinese officials
had little say in the production of such images.81
As if to stress the importance of photographic portraiture to the RNG,
many of Wang’s followers within the RNG also turned to this medium when
cultivating their own status. While Wang Jingwei remained the embodiment of
this regime until his death in 1944, other leaders, such as Zhou Fohai (figure
12), and Wang’s wife Chen Bijun, all posed for studio portraits at one stage or
another during the occupation, and all used factional media sources to dis-
tribute such images. However, in terms of the sheer number of portraits, or the
scale of their distribution, none could compete with Wang Jingwei.
Figure 10. Unknown photographer, Wang
Ching-wei at statue of Sun Yat-sen [sic],
19 March 1940. Corbis Images.
78 – Xue, E Gan shidi shichaji, 10.
79 – An important symbolic event
recounted in Yue Du, ‘Sun Yat-sen as
Guofu: Competition over Nationalist Party
Orthodoxy in the Second Sino-Japanese
War’, Modern China, 45:2 (2019), 201–35.
80 – As evidenced in a photograph of
Wang posing for this painting with Asai
himself: ‘Wang Jingwei having his portrait
painted’, 16 August 1940, object: ddr-njpa
-1-1067 (G388.040), Denshō Digital
Repository, available at http://ddr.densho.
org/ddr-njpa-1-1067/(accessed
5 August 2019).
81 – See Zhou Fohai riji quanbian, shang-
bian (The complete, edited diaries of Zhou
Fohai, Part I), ed. Cai Dejin, Beijing:
Zhongguo wenlian chubanshe 1998, 262.
The extant photographic record suggests
that such paintings were rarely hung in
public spaces – I have yet to see
a photograph of an RNG office in which
anything other than a photographic por-
trait of Wang was hung.
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Bann’s Studio and the Militarisation of Wang’s Image
In autumn 1941, the MoP approached a commercial purveyor of studio portrai-
ture to craft a new set of images of Wang Jingwei to align with the shifting realities
of the Second Sino-Japanese war. Bann’s Studio (Guangyi zhaoxiangguan) was
typical of the dozens of commercial studios that had operated in China’s largest
city in the prewar decades, having opened for business in Shanghai in 1927. The
studio took its English trading name from the Anglicisation of the surname of its
founder, Peng Wangshi, a Chinese photographer who had studied in Japan, and
who had established a name for himself as an innovative photographer of Chinese
landscapes in the 1920s. Accordingly, the studio marketed itself as ‘yishu zhaox-
iang de zui gao shuizhun’ (the highest standard in artistic photography).82 More
importantly, Bann’s had produced portraits for both cultural and political celeb-
rities in this period, such as the poet Xu Zhimo and the Nationalist finance
minister T. V. Soong, as well as hundreds of other lesser known clients, including
those who had fought the Japanese in earlier conflagrations (figure 13). Bann’s
portraits had even graced the cover of Young Companion, and are still lauded in
histories of Republican-era photography today.83 While this pedigree may have
been relevant in having Bann’s commissioned to produce a new set of portraits in
1941, the fact that Bann’s had opened a branch office in Nanjing, the RNG capital,
at some stage after 1940 also suggests a political proximity to the Wang regime.84
One of Bann’s Nanjing-based photographers, Liang Boping, was responsible for
this new set of 1941 portraits.85
Figure 11. Unknown photographer, Wang
Jingwei having his portrait painted, August
1940. Denshō Digital Repository (ddr-njpa
-1-1067), Hawai’i Times Photo Archives.
Courtesy of the Hawai'i Times Photo
Archives Foundation.
82 – Advertisements for Bann’s appeared,
for example, in the newspaper Jing bao
(16 November 1944), 2.
83 – Such as Chen Xuesheng, Xunhui shi-
luo de minguo sheying (Searching for the
lost photography of Republican China),
Taipei: Fukai yishu 2015, 117–19.
84 – Although it was certainly not the only
studio to operate in the city. Nanjing
newspapers from the occupation era, such
as Jing bao, often featured advertisements
for other commercial photographic studios.
85 – Other photographs produced by Liang
and circulating now on Chinese auction
sites would suggest that Liang was
a purveyor of wedding portraits.
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The production of these portraits was timed to coincide with the broadening of
the Rural Pacification (qingxiang) campaigns. These campaigns had first been intro-
duced in July 1941 by the Japanese military with the specific aim of wiping out
communist-led resistance in the villages of Zhejiang and Jiangsu.86 They were more
than a military purge, however, for Rural Pacification involved RNG cadres reed-
ucating ‘pacified’ villagers about the need for greater levels of RNG control. Indeed,
the campaigns were designed to involve Japanese-led military ‘pacification’ in the
countryside alongside RNGmanagement of political and cultural affairs in such areas,
and their prosecution was inspired by prewar attempts by Chiang Kai-shek to
eradicate rural Chinese communist bases.87
While Rural Pacification has often been depicted as little more than an
excuse for Japanese violence,88 this campaign also entailed the militarisation of
Wang Jingwei’s image, and the widespread promotion of Wang, for the first
time, beyond the confines of occupied China’s cities. CNA journalists were
dispatched to follow and document Wang Jingwei’s ‘inspections’ (xunshi) of
pacified areas,89 while public art depicting Wang himself in the form of murals
Figure 12. Cover of Guomin xinwen hua-
bao, 2 (November 1941), featuring
colourised portrait of Zhou Fohai by
unknown photographer. Courtesy of
Shanghai Library.
86 – Gregor Benton, New Fourth Army:
Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze
and the Huai, 1938–1941, Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press 1999, 249–50.
87 – David Serfass, ‘L’occupation Japonaise
comme objet pour l’histoire de l’État
Chinois: l’exemple de la campagne de paci-
fication rurale de gouvernement de Wang
Jingwei, 1941–45’ (The Japanese occupation
as an object for the history of the Chinese
state: the example of the rural pacification
campaigns of the Wang Jingwei govern-
ment, 1941–45), Études Chinoises, 35:2
(2016), 123–37.
88 – For a typical example, see Wang wei
zhengquan ziliao xuanbian: Wang Jingwei
guomin zhengfu ‘qingxiang’ yundong
(Collection of material relating to the bogus
Wang regime: the Wang national govern-
ment’s Rural Pacification campaign), ed.
Zhu Xu Zidao, Liu Qikui and Cao Zhenwei,
Shanghai: Xinhua shuju 1985.
89 – Anon, ‘Wang weiyuanzhang san ci
xunshi qingxiangqu ji’ (An account of
Chairman Wang’s third tour of the Rural
Pacification areas), Zhongyang daobao
zhoukan, 2:39 (April 1942), 19.
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was added to village walls.90 It was within this context that Liang Boping’s new
set of studio portraits was created.
Aesthetically, there is little remarkable about the 1941 Rural Pacification
portraits. In terms of their composition, for example, they represent nothing
unusual or innovative in the grander scheme of studio portraiture in Republican
China. The manufacture of these new portraits, however, did mark an important
departure in the framing of a leader who had spent his entire career cultivating
a civilian persona, and who had been repackaged by his supporters in 1939 in
a decidedly civilian, if romantic, fashion. Prior to 1941, Wang had never been
photographed in a studio while wearing a military uniform.
In these new portraits, a bemedalled Wang is shown dressed in the uniform of
a field officer (figure 14). Some of the portraits are three-quarter-length images,
while others show Wang from the shoulders up. In some cases, Wang holds
a ceremonial sword in gloved hands. In all cases, Wang – his face fully lit and
Figure 13. Bann’s Studio, photograph of
Huang U-pei, gelatin silver print on card,
29 July 1932. Courtesy of the Wing Luke
Museum of the Asian Pacific American
Experience.
90 – Many of these are now held at
Academia Historica in Taipei, which
houses one of the most extensive collec-
tions of documentary photography pro-
duced by the RNG. This collection can be
accessed online, available at www.drnh.gov.
tw (accessed 5 August 2019). On this col-
lection, see Dai Jieming, ‘Yi tuxiang shiliao
tanjiu Wang Zhaoming zhengquan zhi
zhengzhi wenhua: Cong Guoshiguan guan-
cang tanqi’ (Studying the political culture of
the Wang Jingwei regime through pictorial
sources: the Academia Historica collec-
tions), Guoshi yanjiu tongxun, 6 (2014),
140–48.
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bearing what can only be described as a neutral and unemotional expression with
none of the vaguely idealistic or romantic features of the 1939 portrait – gazes
directly at the viewer. Far less emphasis is placed on Wang’s brilliantined hair in
these portraits; indeed, in a number of these images, Wang wears a military cap
(figure 15).
In their prominent inclusion of medals, collar insignia pins, buckles, and belts,
this new set of portraits adopts elements of the iconic imagery of Chiang Kai-shek
that had been produced by Kwong Hua Studio four years earlier. Wang in 1941 is
dressed in a similar uniform to the one Chiang had worn in 1937, and carries the
same symbolic objects, such as a ceremonial sword, with which Chiang had been
associated in early wartime portraiture. Yet these new portraits also present Wang
in a far less idealistic guise than the 1939 portraits had done. Under much fuller
lighting, and captured with a far sharper focus, Liang Boping reveals the circles
under Wang’s eyes and the impurities in his facial skin. The hazy but timeless
Figure 14. Liang Boping (Bann’s Studio),
portrait of Wang Jingwei, gelatin silver
print on card, circa October 1941. Lin
Baisheng Photographic Collection.




idealist of 1939 is replaced by an older but more thoughtful military leader. Wang
had visibly aged during his almost two years in power, and the claims to martyr-
dom that RNG cadres made about him are now in full view, etched in his face
rather than expressed by the ‘distressed countenance’ of prewar portraiture. At the
same time, in the posed and formal nature of the new portraits, one can detect
a degree of reflexive complicity on Wang’s part.91 In Bann’s Studio, Wang is
showing himself to be entirely in control of his image, and confident in his control
of occupied China.
One might assume that such portraits represented a cynical attempt to rouse
confidence in Wang’s nominal leadership of Rural Pacification. As RNG cadres
entered ‘pacified’ villages, they would display the image of a Chinese military
leader rather than Japanese officers to local residents. I would suggest, however,
that they can also be interpreted as an attempt to wrest control of Wang’s image
away from Japanese news agencies, creating a new representation of Wang which
Figure 15. Liang Boping (Bann’s Studio),
portrait of Wang Jingwei, gelatin silver
print on card, circa October 1941. Lin
Baisheng Photographic Collection.
Courtesy of the East Asia Library, Stanford
University.
91 – I thank one of the anonymous
reviewers of History of Photography for this
observation.
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makes reference to earlier Wang portraiture, but also seeks to transform him into
a military officer. If Rural Pacification was as much about the RNG exerting
control over rural China as it was about Japanese military might, then it was
also an attempt to project a dynamic, assertive, and martial image of the regime
with which Wang was so closely associated. In this way, Rural Pacification
challenged earlier Japanese attempts to pacify the image of occupied China, and
to render its collaborationist leadership visually docile or passive. Portraits of the
RNG leader which took visual cues from the iconography of early-wartime
resistance, yet maintained recognisable elements of RNG hagiography stressing
the notion of Wang as a martyr to the cause of peace, represented an attempt to
establish at least limited RNG agency in occupation visual culture. It is no
coincidence that Liang’s portraits emerged just as occupation newspapers were
also publishing photographs of a uniformed Wang Jingwei in situ, touring rural
areas, all openly attributed to RNG – that is, Chinese – photographers employed
by the CNA.92
Liang Boping’s military portraits remain some of the most widely circulated
ephemera from the RNG today. They were used extensively in various forms and
contexts by the RNG for the remainder of the war. In early 1942, for instance, they
were rebranded as products of the New Citizens Movement (Xin guomin yun-
dong), a mass mobilisation campaign that the RNG introduced in January
that year, and which oversaw the militarisation of everyday life, especially for
the urban youth of occupied China. It was under this movement that a far greater
degree of mass worship of Wang as a ‘zuigao lingxiu’ (supreme leader) was
encouraged by the MoP.93 In other instances, the portraits were published in
proximity to Sun Yat-sen portraits in occupation pictorials, suggesting that the
RNG found in these 1941 images a set of Wang iconography that was solemn
enough to be associated with the Republic of China’s ‘Founding Father’ (Guofu).94
They would also inspire later portraits of Wang in military uniform, especially in
the uniform of the RNG navy (a largely symbolic and river-based military force),
which would become commonplace in 1943, following Wang Jingwei’s declaration
of war on the Western Allies in January that year. It was an unattributed portrait
of Wang in military uniform, sharing much in common with the Rural
Pacification portraits of 1941, which would literally follow Wang to his grave at
the end of 1944, when it was chosen to accompany his cortege to a burial site just
outside Nanjing.95
Conclusion: Towards a History of the ‘Occupied Lens’
Almost all of the literature on photography under Japanese occupation in China
focuses on questions of the colonial gaze. Historians of photography have, under-
standably, been interested in attempts by Japanese photographers to capture their
interpretations of a conquered China.96 In focusing on such issues, however, the
field has largely overlooked the ways in which forms of photography which were
derivative of prewar Republican Chinese practices could also be used by the
Chinese living under occupation even as the Japanese gazed at them. The RNG
succeeded in ensuring that distinctly Chinese forms of studio portraiture survived
under occupation, and that continuities with prewar photography were put at the
forefront of occupation iconography. The RNG did this because it saw the
potential of such forms in promoting its figurehead as a legitimate political, and
later military, leader.
Like the ‘photographic realist’ art of Vichy France examined by Laurence
Bertrand Dorléac, portrait photography produced under the RNG was perhaps
‘not very different from the art realized under other regimes’, and involved simply
adding the figure of China’s ‘collaborationist’ leader ‘to the same old styles’ (as had
92 – Anon, ‘Wang weiyuanzhang san ci
xunshi qingxiangqu ji’, 19.
93 – Luo Junqiang, ‘Weiting youying lu: Dui
Wang wei zhengfu de huiyi jishi’ (Secret
records of the puppet government: my
memoirs of the bogus Wang government),
in Wei ting youying lu: Dui Wangwei
zhengquan de huiyi (A secret record of the
puppet government: memoirs from the
Wang Jingwei regime), ed. Huang Meizhen,
Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe 1986, 49.
94 – Du, ‘Sun Yat-sen as Guofu’.
95 – Taylor, ‘From Traitor to Martyr’.
96 – Kari Shepherdson-Scott, ‘A Legacy of
Persuasion: Japanese Photography and the
Artful Politics of Remembering
Manchuria’, Journal of Decorative and
Propaganda Arts, 27 (2015), 124–47.
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occurred for Philippe Pétain in Vichy France).97 However, by resurrecting prewar
political portraiture and by calling on Chinese photographers to manufacture such
images, the RNG was marking itself out as a distinctly Chinese regime, in spite of
the Japanese presence. What I refer to here as the ‘occupied lens’ was entirely
cognisant of Japanese control. Yet it strove to maintain recognisably Republican
Chinese forms in the construction of iconography under occupation by creating
new portraits of Wang in the guise of an idealist patriot or a field officer. Such
iconography owed far more to middle-class Shanghai than to immediate Japanese
precedents. In light of the uses of photography by Japanese propaganda agencies to
promote emperor worship in this same period, it is significant that so many studio
portraits of Wang were created at all under the RNG. Also, the sheer longevity of
a number of the portraits examined in this article, on online auction sites or on the
panels displayed at historical sites in China today,98 suggest that the occupation
did little to undermine the skill that Chinese studio photographers themselves had
developed in the decade or more prior to Japan’s invasion.
The portraits of Wang created by Chinese photographers under occupation
are clearly inspired by events beyond the studio, and by the effective use of
political portraiture by the Chinese resistance from 1937 onwards. We can see
this in everything from the defiance of the 1939 image of Wang, in which he ‘lifted
himself upright to save the nation’ and overcame doubts about his mortality, to the
militarisation of the Rural Pacification and subsequent portraits. The influence of
the photographic by-products of the wartime Chiang Kai-shek personality cult can
be felt in each of these, as the RNG reverted to a visual rhetoric which spoke at
once of Chinese defiance and autonomy.
Ultimately, however, the RNG was reliant on Japanese acquiescence, control,
and capital to see that such imagery was circulated. In this regard, studio photo-
graphy – or, to be more precise, the cultural biographies of specific portraits – can
shed light on the limits of the RNG’s deployment of portrait photography when it
comes to carving out a third space between the visual dominance of the occupier
and the visual cultures of resistance. It was all very well for RNG propagandists to
commission local photographers to craft new portraits of Wang Jingwei; it was
quite another thing to ensure that these portraits were circulated beyond Nanjing,
in a manner which fitted an RNG – rather than a Japanese – agenda. In the hands
of Japanese editors or propagandists, a defiant portrait of a ‘resurrected’ Wang
Jingwei produced by a Shanghai-based newspaper could quite easily be turned into
an image of global fascism, or a crass advertisement for eye drops.
In this regard, we find parallels between Chinese portrait photography under
Japanese occupation and Dutch portrait photography under Nazi occupation at
precisely the same time. As Remco Ensel reminds us, the ‘character and meaning’
of portrait photography can be completely transformed when it is reproduced in
a new, occupied, context.99 The consequences of such a simple argument for the
study of photographic culture under the RNG are profound: a Shanghai-style
studio portrait can, through Japanese manipulation, be subsumed into the visual
cultures of the Axis powers.
In the course of conducting research for this article, I have also been struck by
the number of alternative portraits of Wang that can be found in archival collec-
tions today (such as figure 16) – some by Liang Boping, but many others
unattributed – which are rarely found in RNG publications of the period or,
indeed, in any published sources at all. To reference Hochberg again, there is
much in the oeuvre of the Zhonghua ribao, Bann’s Studio, or the MoP which
remains, to this day, unseen. Similarly, it was only by the grace of Japanese editors
that the 1939 and 1941 portraits of Wang were distributed so widely in the first
place (and for reasons we shall perhaps never know). The ‘occupied lens’ was thus
ultimately limited in the propagation of its vision by the control of Japanese
censors and publishers. Similarly, while we find in the RNG creation and
97 – Laurence Bertrand Dorléac, Art of the
Defeat: France 1940–1944, Los Angeles:
Getty Publications 2008, 139.
98 – The 1939 Zhonghua ribao portrait, for
example, is still used to adorn tourist sites
in Nanjing today, such as the former site of
the central government of the Republic of
China (Guomin zhengfu).
99 – Remco Ensel, ‘Dutch Face-ism:
Portrait Photography and Völkisch
Nationalism in the Netherlands’, Fascism, 2
(2013), 18–40.
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distribution of official portraits a continuation of prewar Republican political
culture, we must also consider the subtle but potentially significant practices
which differentiated this from other twentieth-century Chinese regimes. The
RNG was the only modern Chinese government not to adopt portraits of its
leader on banknotes or coinage,100 and – unlike both Chiang Kai-shek’s
Nationalists and Mao Zedong’s post-1949 People’s Republic of China – the RNG
did not introduce extensive laws governing the placement or production of Wang
portraits.101 All of this suggests that the ‘occupied lens’ did not always equate with
a confidence in the longevity of this regime amongst RNG propagandists.
While this study ends with the Rural Pacification portraits of late 1941, new
portraits of Wang were produced well into 1943 by both Chinese and Japanese
Figure 16. Unknown photographer, por-
trait of Wang Jingwei in naval uniform,
gelatin silver print on card, circa 1942. Lin
Baisheng Photographic Collection.
Courtesy of the East Asia Library, Stanford
University.
100 – Wang Jingwei yu Wang wei zhengfu,
ed. Huang.




photographers. The challenge for future students of this topic may be to determine
just what it was about any of Wang’s numerous wartime portraits which saw them
favoured or ignored by the RNG, the Japanese, or Wang himself. We also need to
interrogate other forms of photography practised under occupation, most noticeably
news photography, a form which developed within the CNA from the middle of 1940
onwards, and which has left to posterity a significant body of photographs that still sit
today, largely unstudied, in the collections of institutions such as Academia Historica
in Taipei. For the time being, however, we would do well to acknowledge the existence
of an ‘occupied lens’, and to consider how the cultural biographies of the portraits it
produced provide a vision of a China which belonged neither to Japan nor to the anti-
Japanese resistance.
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